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IBP, INC. v. ALVAREZ ANDABDELA TUMv. BARBER
FOODS, INC.-REVISITING THE LIMITATIONS OF THE
PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT.
by
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, JD, LLM*
The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 1 is the federal statute that
places limits on the types of employee activities that are
compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA). 2 Although the activities covered by this law may only
involve a few minutes in a worker's day, mischaracterizing
whether those activities are compensable under the FLSA or
noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act can result in
significant monetary consequences for both the employee and
the employer. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court reconsidered
the question of what constitutes compensable time in the
consolidated cases of IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, et al. and Abdela
Tum, et al. v. Barber Foods, Inc. 3 The issue before the court
was whether an employer is exempt under the Portal-to-Portal
Act from paying for three types of employee activities: the
time that an employee spends waiting to receive protective gear
that must be worn at the worksite, the time that it takes to don
and doff that protective gear, and the time it takes to walk
between the place where the gear is donned and doffed and the
production area. The court concluded that even though the
statutory workday does not include the waiting time, it
certainly includes the donning, doffing, and traveling time
when those activities are "integral and indispensable" to the
"principal activity" of the employee's work.
*Associate Professor of Legal Studies m Business, Iona
College, New Rochelle, New York.

53 I Vol. 18 I North East Journal of Legal Studies

Congress originally enacted the FLSA in response to a
general finding that labor conditions in the 1930s were
"detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for the health, efficiency, and general wellbeing ofworkers."4 Two key provisions of the statute require
employers to pay workers a minimum wage 5 and to prohibit
them from employing workers in excess of 40 hours per week
unless the workers receive overtime compensation at a rate not
less than one and one-halftimes the regular rate ofpay.6
Although §203 defines many of the terms used in the FLSA, it
fails to define two significant ones--"work" and "workweek."
The U.S. Supreme Court made up for this omission in a series
of 1940's decisions that interpreted those terms not only in
the context of the standard definitions found in Webster's
Dictionary but also in light of the remedial purposes of the
FLSA. In the first case, Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v.
Muscoda Local No. 123, 7 the court held that for statutory
purposes "work or employment" included "physical or mental
exertion (whether burdensome or not)
controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily
and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his
business." 8 Later that same year, in the case of Armour & Co.
v. Wantock et al} the court clarified its definition of "work" by
noting that "exertion" on the part of the employee is not
necessary if the employer has hired the employee "to do
nothing, or to do nothing but to wait until something
happens." 10 Two years later, in the case of Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co. , 11 the court expanded the meaning of
"statutory workweek" to include "all time during which an
employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's
premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace." 12 That meant
that employers had to compensate employees for the time spent
walking between the time clocks at the factory entrance and the
employees' actual workstations as well as for time required to
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The
complete a variety of preliminary work activities.
Anderson decision prompted a more employer-sympathetic
Congress to amend the FLSA through the passage of the
Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947.
Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act out of a concern
that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the terms "work"
and "workweek" superseded "long-established customs,
practices, and contracts between employers and employees,
thereby creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in
amount and retroactive in operation." 14 The Portal-to-Portal
Act addressed the employers' concerns by creating statutory
remedies that were intended to apply retroactively as well as
prospectively. Under Part II, §2 of the Act, (entitled "Relief
from Existing Claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act"), an
employer was no longer be liable for claims filed prior to the
enactment of the statute so long as those claims arose from
activities that were neither compensable under an express
15
contract nor an established custom or practice.
In addition,
under Part III, §4, (entitled "Relief for Certain Future Claims
under the Fair Labor Standards Act"), an employer would not
have to compensate employees for any time spent going to and
from the actual place where the principal employment activities
were performed or for any time devoted to activities that are
preliminary to or postliminary to the workers' principal
16
employment acttvtttes.
0

0

0

Soon after Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal Act, the
Department of Labor issued regulations limiting the scope of
the new law. Both 29 C.F.R. §790.6(a) and §790.6(b) provided
guidance on how to calculate compensable hours. According
to §790.6(a), the computation of FLSA compensable hours was
not changed by the terms of the Portal-to-Portal Act so long as
17
the time claimed was "within" the workday.
Section
790.6(b) went on to endorse a "continuous workday rule" that

measured the workday as "the period between the
commencement and completion on the same workday of an
employee's principal activity or activities." 18 When read
together, the two regulations supported the conclusion that
under the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act, an activity was a
compensable "workday" activity if it occurred within "the
continuous workday."
The U.S. Supreme Court further restricted the impact of the
Portal-to-Portal Act in its decision in the case of Steiner v.
Mitchell. 19 The key to that case was the recognition of a
distinction between employee activities that were "preliminary
and postliminary" to the workday and employee activities that
were "preparatory and concluding" but still within the
workday. The court's ruling that the employees at the battery
factory had a statutory right to be compensated for the time
they spent changing their clothes at the beginning of the shift
and showering at the end of the shift was based on two
important factual findings. The first was that the employees
worked with dangerously caustic and toxic materials. The
second was that they were required, for public health and
safety reasons, to change their clothes and shower before they
could leave the workplace. The court noted that there was a
substantial difference between employees changing and
showering at the end of work under normal conditions and their
changing and showering as a result of health and safety risks
associated with the production of batteries. That difference
meant that the latter could be classified as activities that are an
"integral and indispensable part of the principal activities." The
court went on to conclude "that activities performed either
before or after the regular shift work, on or off the production
line, are compensable under the portal-to-portal provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act if those activities are an integral
and indispensable part of the principal activities for which the
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covered workmen are employed and are not specifically
20
excluded by §4(a)(l ). "

Barber Foods was that the issue was no longer whether
donning and doffing of mandatory protective gear was
compensable. The new focus was on the issue of whether two
employee activities--the time spent waiting to collect the
protective gear and the time spent either walking to a work site
after donning the gear or walking from the work site to the area
where the gear is doffed--are integral and indispensable to the
employee's work and, therefore, compensable.

The Steiner decision acknowledged that the Portal-to-Portal
Act was the consequence of a negative Congressional reaction
to the Anderson case. The court also admitted that it had
experienced difficulty in trying to understand some of the
provisions of the new act. While the purpose of §2 was clearly
to limit an employer's liability for unexpected wages based on
activities occurring before 1947, the purpose of other sections
was much less obvious. The court found it necessary to review
the legislative history- and especially that of the Senate--in
order to untangle the statutory ambiguity. Much of the court's
inquiry was directed at understanding the meaning of the
21
phrase "principal activity or activities" as it was used in §4.
In the end, the court concluded that "while Congress intended
to outlaw claims prior to 1947 for wages based on all employee
activities unless provided for by contract or custom of the
industry, including, of course, activities performed before or
after regular hours of work, it did not intend to deprive
employees of benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act where
they are an integral part of and indispensable to their principal
activities.'m Consequently, whether an employer had to
compensate an employee for work that had been performed
before or after the regular work shift and on or off the
production line depended on whether those activities were an
"integral and indispensable part of the principal activities for
which the person was employed" as opposed to being
"preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or
activities."
Nearly fifty years after Steiner, the Supreme Court agreed to
reconsider the question of the FLSA compensability in two
new donning and doffing cases. The primary difference
between the Steiner case and the consolidated cases of JBP and

II.
The IBP and Barber Foods cases both involved FLSA
claims by workers employed in the food processing industry.
IBP, Inc. , the world's largest producer of fresh beef, pork, and
related products, operates a "kill and processing plant" in
Pasco, Washington. At the time of the lawsuit, the employees
at the Pasco plant included approximately 178 workers in the
slaughter division and 800 line workers in the processing
division. All of the production workers in both divisions were
required to wear sanitary outer garments, hardhats, haimets,
earplugs, gloves, sleeves, aprons, leggings, and boots. Others,
including those who worked with knives, also had to wear
protective equipment including chain link metal aprons, vests,
plexiglass armguards, and special gloves. When the protective
gear was not being use, it had to be stored in locker rooms at
the plant. 23
The production line workers at the Pasco plant were covered
by a collective bargaining agreement that required them to be
at their workstations and prepared to work from the moment
the first piece of meat came across the production line. Prior to
arriving at their workstations, the employers had to gather their
assigned equipment, don that equipment in the locker rooms,
and prepare work-related tools. It was only when these tasks
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were completed that the employees could walk to the slaughter
or processing floors. If employees needed to visit the cafeteria
or restrooms during their unpaid thirty-minute meal break, they
were required to remove the outer garments, protective gear,
gloves, scabbards, and chains. (It was the company's policy
that any time needed to doff and don the equipment had to be
completed during the break time.) Finally, at the end of each
workday, the workers were required
to clean,
restore, and
.
.
24
return their equipment to the appropnate on site storage area.

the meat room associates (who blended the raw products with
the ingredients), the shipping and receiving associates, the
maintenance workers, and the sanitation workers. 26 All of the
production workers were required to wear certain kinds of
protective gear that had to be donned before the workers
punched in and doffed after they punched out. The required
gear included lab coats, hairnets, and earplugs for the rotating
27
associates; lab coats, hairnets, earplugs, safety glasses, steeltoed boots, bump hats, back belts, and lock-out/tag out
equipment for the set-up operators; lab coats, hairnets,
earplugs, safety glasses, steel-toed boots, and back belts for
meatroom associates; 28 and steel-toed boots, hard hats, and
29
back belts for shipping and receiving associates.

Although the IBP workers were required to use a
computerized "swipe card" system when they arrived at
left the plant, they were not paid based on the data from their
individual swipe cards. Pay was based, instead, on a "gang
time pay" model. Under such a plan, workers only received
were
compensation for the actual time that all of the
actually cutting and bagging meat. Compensable time
with the processing of the first piece of meat and ended with
the processing of the last piece of meat. As a result,
were not paid for the time it took to don and doff the protective
gear or for the time needed to walk between the locker rooms
and production floor at the beginning and end of the work
25
shifts.
The second of the two consolidated cases involved a claim,
which was filed against Barber Foods, Inc. , by some of the 300
hourly wageworkers at its Portland, Maine plant. .
employees, who were divided between two shifts With SIX
production lines each, worked in the secondary processing of
poultry-based products. The poultry products, which were
assembled on three specialty production lines, were pouched,
packed, and palletized on three pack-out production lines. The
production workers included the rotating associates (who
rotated to different positions every few hours), the set-up
operators (who maintained the various machines on the lines),

Barber Foods provided the mandatory equipment to the
employees. Some items, such as the bump hats, back belts,
safety glasses, steel-toed boots, and reusable earplugs that were
given to the workers on a one-time basis and replaced only as
needed, could be stored either in the workers' lockers or at
their homes. The rest of the items had to be picked up and
returned to a variety of locations in the plant by the employees
each day. 30 It was only after the workers have waited for,
collected, and donned their equipment that they were allowed
31
to punch in at their designated computerized time clocks.
Employees were paid from the moment that they punched in
until the moment that they punched out. In addition, the
company had a twelve minute "swing time" that allowed an
employee to punch in up to six minutes early and get paid for
that time or punch out up to six minutes late without being
charged with an attendance violation.
III.
The IBP and Barber Foods cases, which were both filed in
federal courts, presented similar, though not identical, claims
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under the FLSA. Both sets of plaintiffs asserted that their
employers had violated the FLSA when they failed to
compensate the workers for the time spent donning and doffing
the protective gear and for the time spent walking between
locker rooms and the production floors of the processmg
facilities. In addition, the employees in Barber Foods claimed
compensation for the time they had spent waiting to receive
their protective gear.

and, therefore, not covered by §4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Noting that the Supreme Court had adopted a context-specific
approach in deciding whether an activity was integral and
indispensable to a principal activity, the Ninth Circuit
evaluated the activities in question to determine if they were
both necessary to the principal work performed and done for
Since federal law (including the
the benefit of IBP. 35
sanitation standards of the Department of Agriculture and the
industry standards of the Occupational Safety and Health),
IBP's own internal rules, and the nature of the work all
required the plaintiffs to don and doff specific gear, the
appellate court concluded that the activities were "necessary"
to the "principal" work performed. The fact that the workers
had to use the protective gear in order to prevent unnecessary
workplace injury and contamination (which would impede
work on the production line) also supported the trial court's
conclusion that the donning, doffing, and cleaning activities
were for the benefit of the employer. 36

a. Alvarez v. IBP.
The JBP class action case was originally filed in the U.S.
32
District Court for the Eastern District ofWashington. After a
twenty-day bench trial, Judge Robert H. Whaley concluded that
the employer were obliged, under the terms of the FLSA, to
compensate the workers for the time they spent donning and
doffing protective gear that was unique to a particular job since
that time was integral and indispensable to the work of the
employees. In addition, employees, who
required
and doff unique protective gear, had to be paid for the time It
took them to walk between the locker room and the production
area since those activities occurred during the continuous
workday. On the other hand, employees were not be entitled to
be paid for the time they had spent in ordinary clothes
changing and washing or for the donning and doffmg of a hard
hat, ear plugs, safety glasses, boots, or a hairnet.
The JBP case was appealed to a three-judge panel of the
33
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In response to
the threshold question of whether the donning and doffing and
waiting and walking constituted "work" under the FLSA," the
34
appellate court answered in the affirmative. The court then
considered whether the activities, which were preliminary and
postliminary to the principal activity of the job, were, if fact,
"an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities"

The Court of Appeals distinguished between the donning,
doffing, and cleaning of unique protective gear (such as Kevlar
gloves) and non-unique gear (such as hard-hats and safety
glasses). While the court concluded that both types of gear
were necessary for the performance of the principal work (and
as such could fall under the Steiner exception), it denied
compensation for the time spent donning and doffing the nonunique gear on the grounds that that time was de minimis as a
matter oflaw. 37
IBP had also argued that 29 U.S.C. §203(o), (hereinafter
referred to as §3(o)), provided a statutory basis for denying
compensation to workers for the time spent donning and
doffing their gear. Section 3(o) of the FLSA excluded from
compensable time "any time spent in changing clothes or
washing at the beginning and end of each workday which was
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excluded from measuring working time during the week
involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice
under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable
to the particular employee." The Circuit Court rejected IBP's
expansive understanding of the phrase "changing clothes." It
reasoned that since there was no statutory clarification,
legislative history, or case law to help explain the meaning of
the phrase, it had no choice but to give the words their
.
.
,38 Th t
"ordmary,
contemporary, common meanmg.
a meant
that the protective gear that had been worn by IBP's workers
and that certainly had been different from typical clothing, did
not "plainly and unmistakably" fit within the statute's meaning
of word "clothing". This conclusion was supported by
reference to an OSHA regulation that had made a similar
analytical distinction between "seneral work clothes" and
9
"personal protective equipment." Consequently, the court
40
held that the §3(o) exemption did not apply in this instance.

the first act of compensable work and did not end until the last
act of compensable work was completed. Since the trial court
had determined that the first act of compensable work had been
the preliminary donning of the protective gear and that the last
act had been the returning to the changing areas and doffing the
gear and since it had also determined that both activities were
"integral and indispensable" to the principal work activities,
the court did not err in holding that the workday included the
reasonable time spent walking between the locker rooms and
the workstations.

The employer was equally unsuccessful in its assertion that
the District Court erred in its determination of what constituted
a compensable workday. IBP suggested that §4(a)(l) of the
Portal-to-Portal Act was a "stand alone" provision that had to
be read to exclude compensation for any and all ''walking,
riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance
of the principal activity."4 1 As such, IBP argued that even if it
had to pay its employees for the time spent donning and
doffing the protective gear, it certainly did not have to
compensate them for the time spent walking between the
locker rooms and their workstations. According to IBP, the
compensable workday was made up of the sum of a number of
discrete periods-the time spent donning and doffing of the
gear and the time spent at the workstation- but not the time
spent walking to the worksite or the principal activity. The
Court of Appeals rejected IBP's arguments and affirmed the
trial judge's view that the compensable workday began with

b. Abdela Tum, et al. v. Barber Foods, Inc.
The Barber Foods case, which was filed in the federal court
in Maine,42 was originally presented to a federal magistrate,
who recommended a partial summary judgment in favor of the
defendant. In the first of two critical rulings, the magistrate
held that the time spent donning and doffing clothing and
equipment was compensable (and not excluded as preliminary
and postliminary activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act) if the
activities had been mandated by the employer or by the
government. Employees, on the other hand, were not entitled
to compensation for the time it took them to don and doff
43
clothing and equipment that they were not required to use.
The second ruling rejected the claim that the employer had to
pay workers for the time they had spent waiting to obtain
mandated gear since these activities could not reasonably be
construed to be an integral part of the employees' work
activities.44 The magistrate concluded by recommending that a
summary judgment be entered denying the claims relating to
the time each employee spent walking from the entrance of the
plant to the employee's workstation, locker, time clock or site
where the required clothing and equipment were distributed
and for claims based on the time spent waiting to punch in or
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out for that clothing and equipment. 45 What the magistrate did
not consider was the applicability of §4 of the Portal-to-Portal
Act to the time spent walking between the place of donning
46
and doffing and the production line.

The appellate court's de novo review of the lower court's
granting of a partial summary judgment focused on two issues.
The first was whether the trial court had erred in denying the
employers compensatioin for the time spent going from place
to place to collect different pieces of required clothing and
gear, for the time spent walking from where those items were
received to the time clocks, and for the time spent doffing and
disposing of the items at the end of the day. The second issue
was whether the court had erred in denying the employees
compensation for the time they had spent waiting in line to
collect the required gear and to punch in at the time clocks.

When the case was presented to the trial court, Judge Gene
Carter followed the recommendation of the magistrate and
granted the partial summary judgment in favor of Barber
Foods. The only unresolved issue involved Barber Foods'
alleged liability for the time its employees spent donning and
doffing various gear. Prior to submitting the case to the jury,
the parties stipulated that four categories of workers (the
rotating, set-up, meatroom, and shipping and receiving
associates) had been required to don and doff protective gear at
the beginning and end of their shifts. The instructions to the
jury asked for a specific set of factual findings. The first
required the jury to determine how much time was reasonably
needed to don and doff the gear. The second asked whether
that time had been de mzmm1s and, consequently,
noncompensable. The jury ultimately concluded that in each
case the time had m fact been de minimis and
noncompensable. 47
Both parties appealed the decisions of the lower court to a
three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. 48 The employees claimed that the lower court had
erred when it granted the partial summary judgment in favor of
the defendants and when it instructed the jury. The employer,
in a cross-appeal, objected to the lower court's ruling that the
donning and doffing of required clothing and equipment had
been an integral part of the employees' work and, as such, had
not qualified as noncompensable preliminary and postliminiary
activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act.

The three-judge panel affirmed the trial court's denial of
compensation for walking time. It found support for the lower
court's decision in 29 C.F.R. §790.7(g) n.49, which provided
that even though the changing of clothes may in "certain
situations be so directly related to the specific work the
employee is employed to perform that it would be regarded as
an integral part of the employee's ' principal activity[,]' this
does not necessarily mean, however, that travel between the
washroom or clothes-changing place and the actual place of
performance of the specific work the employee is employed to
perform, would be excluded from the type of travel to which
the section 4(a) [Portal-to-Portal Act] refers. "49 The appellate
court further stated that even if it had assumed, for the sake of
argument, that employees had been engaged in an integral and
indispensable part of their principal employee activities when
they donned and doffed mandated gear, their walking time
would still be noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. 5°
Just because the traditional understanding of a primary activity
had been stretched to cover donning and doffing in a very
limited number of cases did not mean that Congress intended to
create an avenue to circumvent the Portal-to-Portal Act's
exemption of preliminary and postliminary activities. 51 The
panel then referred to 29 C.F.R. §790.7 to determine whether
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the walking in this case had merely been a "preliminary or
postliminary" activity. After differentiating the facts in this
case from the examples listed in the federal regulation, the
court found that the time that had been spent walking from
place to place to gather ordinary safety gear and to punch in
"[fell] outside of the narrow category of walking that [was}
"not segreable from the simultaneous performance of [their]
. d work .,,52
asstgne

shift. This conclusion was based on the court's understanding
of29 C.F.R. § 790.7(g) n. 49 and a narrower understanding of
the term "workday". 56 The issue ofwhether employees should
be compensated for waiting in line to receive mandated gear
and to punch in at the time clocks was also decided in favor of
the employer. The court characterized this as a classic FLSA
case of "waiting to be engaged" and not as a case of "engaged
to wait." It went on to note that even if the waiting time
qualified as "engaged to wait" time, it would not be
compensable since it also constitutes a preliminary or
postliminary activity that is noncompensable under the Portalto-Portal Act. 57 Finally, the court rejected both the employer's
cross-appeal (on the grounds that a party cannot appeal a
favorable judgment merely to obtain the review of a finding it
deems erroneous) and the employee's objection to the jury
instructions (on the grounds that the instructions were correct
58
and did not confuse or mislead the jury.)

The appellate court also rejected both of the employees'
claims that they should have been compensated for the time
that they spent waiting to punch in and waiting to collect the
required clothing or gear. The panel found no persuasive
argument to depart from the general rule, articulated in 29
C.F.R §790.8 (c) n. 67, that states that even when changing
clothes has been considered to be a principal activity,
"activities such as checking in and out and waiting in line to do
so would not ordinarily be
as integral parts of the
3
principal activity or activities."
The panel similarly rejected
the employees' claim that they should have been compensated
for the time they had spent waiting to collect the required gear
after noting that 29 C.F.R. §790.8 states that a reasonable
amount of time was intended to be preliminary and
54
postliminary- and noncompensable.
The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs' request for a
rehearing and reaffirmed the decision of the district court and
the three-judge pane1. 55 The court began by agreeing that the
donning and doffing of gear was only an integral and
indispensable part of an employee ' s principal activities when
the employer or government had mandated the use of the gear.
It went on to reject the employees ' claims that they should
have been compensated for any walking time that occurred
between when the employees picked up their first piece of
required gear and when they returned the gear at the end of the

IV.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to the
consolidated cases of IBP and Barber Foods in order to resolve
the differences between the lower courts on two questions.
The first question was whether the FLSA required the
employer to pay an employee for postdonning and predoffing
walking time. The second question, which had only been
raised in the Barber Foods case, was whether the FLSA also
required the employer to compensate an employee for the time
spent waiting to collect the protective gear. The court's
opinion, which was delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens,
held that an employer was required to compensate employees
for the time they spent walking between changing and
production areas when the donning and doffing of required
gear was "integral and indispensable" to the workers'
"principal activities." Under the continuous workday rule, the
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workday began when the required gear was donned and
continued uninterrupted until the gear was finally doffed.
Since the time spent waiting to receive and don the first piece
of gear was more properly characterized as a "preliminary"
activity, it was not compensable under the terms of the Portalto-Portal Act.
The court's unanimous decision began with a summary of
the legislative history of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act
and with a review of the judicial interpretation of the statutes.
Particular attention was paid to §4(a) of the law, which had
narrowed the scope of future FLSA claims. The court conceded
that §4(a) had nullified previous judicial decisions that had
allowed compensation to employees both for the time spent on
the employer's premises walking to and from the actual place
where the employees' principal activities were performed and
for the time spent performing activities that were "preliminary
59
or postliminary" to the employees' principal activities.
On
the other hand, the court found that, except for those two types
of activities, the Portal-to-Portal Act had not altered the judicial
interpretation of the terms "work" and "workday" nor had it
60
provided an alternative definition for the term "workday." It
also noted that the regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor
after the passage of the legislation indicated that the statute had
had no effect on the computation of hours worked within the
61
'workday' proper (29 C.F.R. §790.6(a)) and that it had not
changed the continuous workday regulation that defined the
workday as the "period of time between the commencement
and completion on the same workday of an em£1oyee's
2
principal activity or activities" (29 C.F.R. §790.6(b).
The
court concluded the first part of its decision by reaffirming its
holding in Steiner that the time spent in activities such as the
donning and doffing of specialized protective gear was
compensable if the activities were an "integral and
63
indispensable part of the principal activities."
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IBP 's appeal was based on its belief that §4(a)(l) of the
Portal-to-Portal Act excluded FLSA compensation for the time
spent walking between the locker rooms and the production
areas. IBP did not challenge the lower court's finding that the
donning and doffin¥ of protective gear were compensable
activities under §4.6 It tried instead to differentiate between
the category of "integral and indispensable" activities that
might be compensible because they are not merely preliminary
or postliminary within the meaning of §4(a)(2)" and the
category of actual "principal activities" which the employee
was "employed to perform" within the meaning of §4(a)(l).
Activities that were "integral and indispensable" to the
"principal activities" of the employee were covered by the
FLSA and not excluded by §4(a)(2). That did not, however,
mean that the "integral and indispensable" activities were
themselves "principal activities" as defined by §4(a)(l). The
significance of this distinction was that while "integral and
indispensable" activities might be compensable, only
"principle activities" could trigger the beginning of the
compensable workday.
IBP's attempt to claim two different meanings for the
phrase "principal activities" under §4(a)(l) and §4(a)(2) of the
Portal-to-Portal Act was rejected by the Supreme Court.
Justice Stevens, referring to the Steiner case, noted that when
activities were "integral and indispensable" to "principal
activities," they were not excluded from FLSA coverage by §4
of the Portal-to-Portal Act precisely because they were
Although the court
themselves "principal activities." 65
acknowledged that Steiner decision had only been concerned
with the meaning of "principal activity or activities" under
§4(a)(2), it presented two reasons why that meaning was also
applicable to §4(a)(l). The first was a matter of normal
statutory interpretation-identical words used in different parts
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of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same
meaning. 66 The second was that the "said principal activity or
activities" referred to in §4(a)(2) was an explicit reference to
.
d
the use of the same term in §4(a)(l).67 The court aIso reJecte
IBP's assertion that some activities may be sufficiently
"principal" to be compensable, but not sufficiently
to commence the workday. It concluded instead that whtle
walking to the locker room to don special safety gear would be
noncompensable time under §4(a)(l), walking from the locker
room after donning the special safety gear would be
compensable §4(a)(l) since the locker
_had
the
relevant "place of performance" of the pnnctpal activity that
6
the employee was employed to perform.

regulations not only supported the employees' view that the
donning and doffing of protective gear were compensable
activities but they also defined the outer limits of the workday.
Both 29 C.F.R. §790.7(c) and §785.38 suggested that the time
spent walking between a locker room and a production area
was similar to the compensable time spent walking between
different workplaces on the disassembly line. 70 The court
noted that while 29 C.F.R. §790.6, measured the limits of most
workdays as "roughly the period 'from whistle to whistle,'" 29
C.F .R. § 790.6(b) stated that the term "workday" had also been
used in the Portal-to-Portal Act to mean, "in general, the period
between the commencement and completion on the same
workday of an employee's principal activity or activities."71
Finally, the court agreed with IBP's claim that, under 29 C.F.R.
§790.7(g), n. 49, the postchanging walking time was not
"necessarily" excluded from the scope of §4(a)(l).72 That,
however, did not help IBP's case since the fact that the activity
was not "necessarily" excluded did not mean that it was always
excluded and since the ambiguity in the regulation's note did
not overcome the meaning of the statute, as it had been
resolved in the Steiner decision. 73 Justice Stevens summarized
the court's holding in the IBP case by stating that if an
employee's activity was "integral and indispensable" to a
"principal activity," it was itself a "principal activity" under
§4(a) of the Portal-to-Portal Act.

In addition to presenting arguments based on the text of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, IBP also suggested that the court should
construe the statute in a way that would effectuate the real
purpose for which it was _enacted. IBP claimed that t?ere
a
proximate cause connection between Supreme Court s
in the Anderson case (in which the court granted compensatiOn
for the time employees spent walking from the punch in clock
to the actual workstation) and the passage of the Portal-toPortal Act (in which Congress excluded from compensation the
time spent walking to and from the actual place of performance
of the principal activity or activities which the employees had
been employed to perform). The court rejected this line of
reasoning on the grounds that there was a crucial
between the walking in the Anderson case and the walkmg m
the IBP case. In the former, the walking occurred before the
workday began whereas in the latter, the walking did not occur
'
69
until the workday had already begun.
The court also considered the impact of a number of
regulations, which had been adopted by the Secretary of Labor
shortly after the enactment of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The

b. Barber Foods, Inc.
It was only after resolving the issues in the IBP case that the

Supreme Court considered the one unique issue in the Barber
Foods case: whether the time that had been spent waiting to
obtain mandatory clothing and equipment was compensable. 74
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The employees claimed that the waiting time was ""integral
and indispensable" to the "principal activity" of donning, and
75
was therefore itself a principal activity." The employer, on
the other hand, took the position that the waiting time qualified
as a "preliminary or postliminary activity" that was explicitly
covered by §4(a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. The court
based its decision in favor of the employer on the distinction it
drew between the time spent donning mandatory gear, "which
was always essential if the worker is to do his job," and the
time spent waiting to receive the gear, which "may or may not
76
be necessary in particular situations or for every employee."
Although the waiting time was certainly a "preliminary"
activity, it was not an activity that was "integral and
indispensable" to a "principal activity." The conclusion that
there was a difference between preshift activities that were
"necessary" to a principal activity and preshift activities that
were "integral and indispensable" to a principal activity was
based on an understanding that the waiting time was analogous
to the kind of walking time, which the court had found to be
compensable in the Anderson case and which Congress had
77
repudiated in the Portal-to-Portal Act.

unavailable to the employees when they finally arrived at the
front of the waiting line? 8 Although the court rejected the
applicability of §790.7(h), it did find §790.7(g) to be pertinent.
Under this section, the Secretary of Labor characterized as
"preliminary," and noncompensable, the time that an employee
waited to check in or to receive a paycheck. The court
concluded that these kinds of collateral activities, which are
similar to the collateral activity of waiting to collect required
gear, are only compensable if they are covered by an
agreement of the parties or by the custom or practice of a
particular industry.

The court also rejected a claim that had been presented by
the government in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the
employees. The government claimed that, under 29 C.F .R.
§790.7(h), when an employee "is required by his employer to
report at a particular hour at his workbench or other place
where he performs his principal activity, if the employee is
there at that hour ready and willing to work but for some
reason beyond his control there is no work for him to perform
until some time has elapsed, waiting for the work would be an
integral part of the employee's principal activities." The
problem with trying to apply this waiting to work regulation to
the Barber Foods case was that there had never been any
allegation or finding that the protective gear had been

V.

The Supreme Court's decision in the consolidated IBP and
Barber Foods case was the not one of the big decisions of the
first year of the new Roberts' court. Nor was it a landmark
employment law case. Instead, the unanimous decision
demonstrated an affirmation by the court of key understandings
of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act. There were no
conceptual changes to the meaning of the words "work,"
"workweek," and "continuous workday." "Preliminary and
postliminary" activities were still found to be distinct from
"preparatory and concluding" activities. The characterization
of preparatory and concluding activities as "integral and
indispensable" to the principal activity still resulted in
increasing the length of the compensable day. Walking time
was found to be compensable while waiting time was not. In
each instance, the court balanced the statutes, the
administrative agency regulations, and past judicial decisions
in order to arrive at a decision that was balanced.
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SENATOR McGRATH: " I think that at this point we might very definitely
make contribution to the legislative history of what we are doing here. Am
I correct in understanding the Senator to say that what the majority of the
committee proposes is that any activity of a worker shall be considered a
part of his principal activity if the doing of that act is indispensable to the
performance of the rest of his day's work?"

17 29 C.F.R. §790.6(a) provides that: "Section 4 of the Portal Act does not
affect the computation of hours worked within the 'workday' proper,

SENATOR COOPER: "I can read the language used in the report, and I
think that language should be used in this connection, because the words
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and phrases it employs were adopted by the committee. On page 48 of the
report, in the definition of 'principal activity,' we fmd these words:

distinction between the type of activity which we consider compensable and
the type which should not be compensable. In accordance with our
intention as to the definition of 'principal activity,' if the employee could
not perform his activity without putting on certain clothes, then the time
used in changing into those clothes would be compensable as part of his
principal activity. One the other hand, if changing clothes were merely a
convenience to the employee and not directly related to the specific work, it
would not be considered a part of his principal activity, and it follows that
such time would not be compensable." ( 93 Cong. Rec. 2297-2298.) Id. at
257-258; 336-337.

'"It will be observed that the particular time at which the employee

commences his principal activity or activities and ceases his principal
activity or activities marked the beginning and the end of his workday. The
term "principal activity or activities" includes all activities which are an
integral part thereof as illustrated by the following examples:
"' 1. In connection with the operation of a lathe an employee will frequently
at the commencement of his workday oil, grease, or clean his machine, or
install a new cutting tool. Such activities are an integral part of the
principal activity, and are included within such term.
'"2. In the case of a garment worker in a textile mill, who is required to
report 30 minutes before other employees report to commence their
or
principal activities, and who during such 30 minutes distributes
parts of clothing at the workbenches of other employees and gets machmes
in readiness for operation by other employees, such activities are among the
principal activities of such employee."'
"We believe that our bill provides that the employee must receive
compensation for such activities."
SENATOR McGRATH: "Then we can clear that point up by reiterating
that what the committee means is that any amount of time spent in the
performance of the type of activity expressed in examples 1 and 2 is to be
hereafter regarded as compensable time."
SENATOR COOPER: "I should certainly say so, as a part of the principal
activity."
.
SENATOR McGRATH: "There are innumerable instances of operations
which have to be performed that are not covered in these particular
examples. I think of one at the moment. In certain of our chemical plants
workers are required to put on special clothing and to take off their clothing
at the end of the workday, and in some of the plants they are required to
take shower baths before they leave. Does the Senator regard such activity
as that as coming within the compensable workday?"
SENATOR COOPER: "I am very happy that the Senator has asked the
question, because I believe it gives the opportunity of drawing a fine
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Rotating associates, set-up operators, and meatroom employees punched
in at a clock near where they work and punched out on clocks next to the
two primary exits. Maintenance workers punched in on a clock in the
maintenance room. Shipping-and-receiving workers used a clock next to
the shipping-and-receiving office to punch in and out. Sanitation workers
punched in on the cafeteria clock and out on the plant office clock. Id. at 5-
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FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF FACULTY AND
STUDENTS: A PERSPECTIVE

77 In this case, the waiting time was two steps removed from the productive
activity on the assembly line and is therefore not "integral and
indispensable" to a "principal activity."
78
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INTRODUCTION
Assume a faculty member at a public college is
reprimanded by her department chair for the following reasons:
she is told that her explanations to her students are unclear. In
a recent class she taught, she gave 13 incompletes. When
students approach her about making up the incomplete, she
does not explain how to successfully complete the course. The
students complain to her chair and she is given a reprimand and
eventually not re-hired.
The faculty member sues the college. She alleges
infringement of her rights to free speech and academic freedom
"in retaliation for her refusal to comply with a request that she
communicate more clearly to her students what was required to
complete the coursework in a class she taught in the fall of
2000." 1
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